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Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty on the Functioningof the European Union appear in the chapter onjudicial cooperation in criminal matters of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OF
(2008) J C 115, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union). They deal with the possible extension of
Eurojust’s powers and with the creation of a European
Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Eurojust was set up by
Council Decision 2002/187/JHA (OJ (2002) L 63/1) as a
body of the European Union with to stimulate and to
improve coordination and cooperation between competent
judicial authorities of the Member States. This Decision
was subsequently amended by Council Decision
2003/659/JHA (OJ (2003) L 245/44) and Council
Decision 2009/426/JHA (OJ (2009) L 138/14.
Many scenarios have been advanced for the
implementation of Articles 85 and 86 TFEU. This brief
overview of the topic argues that a step by step approach
should be possible, with a half-way house between
coordination and a purely vertical, centralised model.
Three possible implementations are summarised in Table 1
below and are discussed in the following sections of the
paper. It is necessary to give some legal, research and
historical background. However, it is not the aim here to
discuss the level of criminal law harmonisation necessary
before these EPPO variants could be set up; neither is
accountability discussed here, as this topic would in itself
warrant discrete treatment. The highly dynamic nature of
European law and European Criminal Law in particular has
been taken for granted here: see V Mitsilegas, (2009),
European Criminal Law – Modern studies in European Law, Hart
Publishing; A Klip (2009) European Criminal Law: An
integrative approach, Antwerp, Oxford, Portland: Intersentia
(http://www.intersentia.be/), Ius Communitatis, vol 2, 2009.
ARTICLE 85: EUROJUST REINFORCED OR
DECENTRALISED EPPO
Article 85(1) TFEU confirms the horizontal
cooperation role of Eurojust: its mission is to support and
strengthen coordination and cooperation between national
investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to
serious crime affecting two or more Member States or
requiring a prosecution on common bases, on the basis of
operations conducted and information supplied by the
Member States’ authorities and by Europol. This enshrines
Eurojust’s role in the Treaty and opens up possibilities:
In this context, the European Parliament and the
Council by means of regulations adopted in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure shall determine
Eurojust’s structure, operation, field of action and tasks.
These tasks may include:
(a) the initiation of criminal investigations, as well as
proposing the initiation of prosecutions conducted by
competent national authorities, particularly those
relating to offences against the financial interest of the
Union;
(b) the coordination of investigations and prosecutions
referred to in point (a);
(c) the strengthening of judicial cooperation, including by
resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction and by close
cooperation with the European Judicial Network.
Those regulations shall also determine arrangements for
involving the European Parliament and national
Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities.
Article 85(2) clarifies that in the prosecutions referred
to in paragraph 1, and without prejudice to Article 86,
formal acts of judicial procedure shall be carried out by the
competent national officials. Article 85(2) however does
not indicate the type of relationship there should be
between the initiator of criminal investigations and
prosecutions related to the financial interests of the
European Union and the competent national authorities.
The future structure of Eurojust is therefore left open.
Article 85 TFEU however makes it clear that although
Eurojust’s general powers may be reinforced as far as
coordination and the resolution of conflicts is concerned,
in relation to offences against the financial interests of the
EU Eurojust may be granted a power to initiate
investigations or prosecutions in the future. Eurojust
Towards a decentralised
European Public Prosecutor’s
Office?
by Simone White and Nicholas Dorn
21409 Amicus 89 Spring text.qxd:Text  29/5/12  14:51  Page 2
3Amicus Curiae Issue 89 Spring 2012
would initiate investigations and prosecutions, whilst
competent national officials would carry out formal acts of
judicial procedure. At present, Eurojust may request
(authors’ emphasis) the competent authorities of the
Member States concerned, giving its reasons, to: (i)
undertake an investigation or prosecution of specific acts;
(ii) accept that one of them may be in a better position to
undertake an investigation or to prosecute specific acts;
(iii) coordinate between the competent authorities of the
Member States concerned; (iv) set up a joint investigation
team in keeping with the relevant cooperation
instruments; (v) provide it with any information that is
necessary for it to carry out its tasks; (vi) take special
investigative measures; (vii) take any other measure
justified for the investigation or prosecution (Art 6 of
Council Decision 2009/426/JHA)
Article 17(7) of the Framework Decision on the
European Arrest Warrant also requires Member States to
notify Eurojust whenever they cannot execute a warrant on
time (Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on
the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States, 2002/584/JHA, OJ
(2002) L 190/1). Eurojust can also advise in situations
where there are multiple conflicting arrest warrants (Art
16(2)).
It is not clear how successful Eurojust has been in the
past in obtaining (authors’ emphasis) that an investigation
or prosecution be undertaken by a Member State authority.
Zwiers has explored this issue.
Although neither the national members nor the College
can properly initiate prosecutions under the Eurojust
Decision, the agency’s requests cannot be refused by the
Member States without them owing an explanation (save
for reasons of national security or hampering ongoing
investigations). The former Eurojust President called
Eurojust an “empowered” network because of this semi-
authority that its requests have. It is also suggested that
Eurojust could seek political pressure on uncooperative
Member States’ authorities by including data on
compliance with its requests in its annual reports (see M
Zwiers, (2011), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office –
analysis of a multi-level criminal justice system, Intersentia,
p 260).
Table 1: Possible implementations of Articles 85 or 86 TFEU in relation to the investigation and prosecution of crimes to the
detriment of the financial interests of the EU
Models New powers/ Institution-building European Possible
structure Criminal Law advantages /
disadvantages
Model 1:
A reinforced Reinforced coordination; No new institution; Continued focus on Close to the present
Eurojust. Art 85 TFEU no major changes to Eurojust is consolidated mutual recognition development path of
(progressive increase structure Eurojust. Politically
of powers). palatable. But might not be
much more effective than
current arrangements?
Model 2:
Decentralised EPPO. Reinforced cooperation. A political choice here: Focus both on mutual Possibly the best basis for
Based on national Heads of national authorities whether the decentralised recognition and operational cooperation.
resources (not “over” are appointed as national entity is designated as an harmonisation. However not widely
them): horizontal EPPs. At EU level they Institution – or simply has discussed. Could be seen as
integration. form a college, with a a secretariat and facilities a “spoiler” for models
Art 85 TFEU at first, rotating chair. No within Eurojust/elsewhere. 1 and 2.
making evolution over-arching ‘head’ at
towards a more European level.
centralised model
under Art 86TFEU
possible
Model 3:
A centralised EPPO Reinforced cooperation. A new, central institution Maximum harmonisation Considerable symbolic
Art 86 TFEU. The EPPO appoints certain created “from Eurojust”, of criminal law. significance. Political
Vertical integration. national prosecutors as financed from the resistance. Not all Member
Original Corpus Juris. EEPs, subordinated to a EU budget. States involved.
central European office. Queries over
Europol and OLAF also effectiveness.
work for the central
EPPO, staffed by
EU officials.
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However, Zwiers goes on to add that such requests were
rare. In 2007, one request to investigate/prosecute and one
request to cede jurisdiction were made by a national
member, and one request to cede jurisdiction was made by
the College.
How easy would it be for Eurojust to initiate
investigations or prosecutions? Eurojust’s national
members are seconded from the EU Member States.
Neither national members nor the College have the power
to investigate, prosecute or bring to judgement the
suspects of criminal offences with a trans-national
dimension. To formally initiate criminal investigations, one
supposes that Eurojust would need to have access to its
own criminal investigation resources. At present Europol
only deals with information, whilst OLAF, a European
Commission Directorate-General, carries out
administrative investigations to further the protection of
the financial interests of the European Union. Were
investigation resources to be subordinated to Eurojust, so
that it could initiate investigations and prosecutions, then
Eurojust could become an EPPO of a sort under Article 85
(1) (a) TFEU. Some changes might also be discussed in
relation to Eurojust’s partners, Europol and OLAF, as part
of the package. A legislative initiative on criminal law
protection and another on the administrative and criminal
law cooperation between competent national authorities
including OLAF have already been planned for the period
leading up to 2013.
Given the wording of Article 85 TFEU, it is possible to
conceive of a Eurojust with reinforced powers under
Article 85(1) (b) and (c) only (as a first step). It would
entail a progressive reinforcement of Eurojust with respect
to coordination and the resolution of conflicts, whilst the
initiation of investigations and prosecutions would be left
to a later date, as soon as supporting legislation can be put
in place, when this would add value to the function or
coordination of criminal investigations and prosecutions
currently exercised by Eurojust. The protection of the
financial interests of the EU could benefit from a general
reinforcement of Eurojust under Article 85(1)(b) and (c).
Eurojust could also start monitoring responses to the
requests to investigate or to prosecute it sends to Member
States’ authorities. This would be a cautious rather than an
adventurous approach, which could leave space for future
development (see model 1 in Table 1).
Another possibility can be envisaged under Article 85
TFEU: a decentralised EPPO. Model 2 is briefly outlined,
focusing on the designation of existing heads of
prosecution services as Members of the EPPO – supported
by a deputy and staff with full powers to divert all the
resources of national prosecution services. This would
dissolve some of the difficulties inherent in arrangements
which, whilst they might have powers in formal terms, are
institutionally and operationally disembodied. Admittedly,
model 2 could simply follow on from model 1. The central
coordinating EPPO would not carry out investigations of
its own and would not therefore be subjected to judicial
review, unlike an EPPO set up under Article 86 TFEU (see
model 3). As Inghelram pointed out:
“It is assumed that, in line with Article 86(2) TFEU, an
EPPO will itself be responsible for carrying out investigations,
even if coercive measures related to these investigations will be
carried out by other authorities. Individuals affected by acts
performed during such investigations therefore seem entitled,
for the purposes of judicial review, to consider that, as a
general rule, they are affected by acts of the EPPO itself. The
situation would be different if an EPPO only had the power to
coordinate investigations carried out by others, or the power to
propose or suggest to other authorities that investigations be
carried out” (J F H Inghelram, (2011), Legal and
Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-Fraud Office
(OLAF:) An analysis with a look forward to a European
Public Prosecutor’s Office, Europa Law Publishing, pp 263-
64).
ARTICLE 86: CREATION OF A (VERTICAL)
EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
The first paragraph of Article 86 states that, in order to
combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the
Union, the Council, by means of regulations adopted with
a special legislative procedure, may establish a European
Public Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust. “From Eurojust”
opens up a number of possibilities. The 2004 House of
Lords enquiry on the EPP opined that (a) the EPP should
oversee Eurojust; (b) that Eurojust itself would take on the
role of the European Public Prosecutor; or that the
European Public Prosecutor, while a separate body, would
join the Eurojust College as an extra member. Eurojust’s
competence being much wider than the proposed initial
competence of the EPP, it is however unlikely that the latter
would oversee the former.
Current thinking in EU policy circles is that:
(i) the development of Eurojust and the creation of an
EPPO could go on in parallel;
(ii) a step by step approach could include first evaluating
the revised Eurojust decision, exploring further the
developments under Article 85 TFEU and then
discussing the establishment of an EPPO from
Eurojust in accordance with Article 86;
(iii) it would also be possible to set up a new institution
to be only loosely connected to Eurojust.
In any case, there would be a link with Eurojust.
Article 86 also provides that the Council shall act
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament. This renders the creation of an EU-wide EPPO
unlikely as some Member States are reluctant and/or would
have to opt in and/or submit an EPPO proposal to
referendum. However, Article 86 goes on to say that in the
absence of unanimity in the Council, a group of at least
nine Member States may request that the draft regulation
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be referred to the European Council. In that case, the
procedure in the Council would be suspended. After
discussion, and in case of a consensus, the European
Council would then refer the draft back to the Council for
adoption within four months.
It is unclear at present whether there might be nine
Member States interested in going forward, although
Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Spain have
expressed interest recently. However, the nine Member
States “reinforced cooperation” scenario seems the most
likely and could proceed on the basis of Articles 20(2) and
329(1) TEU.
A number of key issues have been raised. One issue is of
knowing whether there is a sufficient level of mutual
recognition and of harmonisation of criminal law and
procedure to enable an EPPO to function. Another issue
concerns the articulation of activities of the European
Public Prosecutor’s Office with the investigation and
prosecution authorities of the Member States and with its
EU partners, Europol and OLAF. In this a quick
retrospective may assist.
FLASHBACK: THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL
FOR A EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The original, classic and ideal model of a European
Public Prosecutor (EPP) can be found in the Corpus Juris
study, directed by Delmas-Marty and published in 1997and
in a subsequent follow-up study in 2000 (see M Delmas-
Marty, (1997), Corpus Juris introducing penal provisions for the
purpose of the financial interests of the European Union,
Economica, Paris, and also House of Lords, Prosecuting
Fraud on the Community’s finances – the Corpus Juris, 9th
Report, 1998-99, HL Paper 62; and further, M Delmas-
Marty and J A E Vervaele, (2000), The implementation of the
Corpus Juris in the Member States, Intersentia, Oxford, four
volumes) In these early studies, a central EPP was
envisaged (based on the French prosecuting model), with
subordinated, delegated European Public Prosecutors
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of EU
fraud in the EU Member States.
These delegated prosecutors would wear two hats, in the
sense that they would apply national law in national cases,
but would apply another set of EU-wide substantive and
procedural criminal law rules for offences affecting the EU
budget found in the Corpus Juris. The EPP would be
independent from the Member States’ governments and
would have the authority to act on her own initiative. The
procedure for appointment, it was suggested, would be
nomination by the Commission and a decision by the
Council under qualified majority. The office holder could
have a non-renewal term of six years. The follow-up study
of 2000 in particular stressed at length the need to adopt
an EPP, because of inter alia the complexity of horizontal
cooperation, the diversity of competent authorities, the
heterogeneous nature of legal instruments, the diversity of
rules of evidence and the lack of admissibility of rules
obtained abroad. Some of these issues have now been dealt
with outside the sphere of the EPP project through mutual
recognition instruments, as we shall see.
Whilst the Corpus Juris envisaged a vertical solution,
horizontal cooperation instruments based on mutual
recognition (such as the European Arrest Warrant) started
being adopted. This means that the resolution to the EPPO
conundrum is unlikely to be resolved on purely orthodox,
vertical or horizontal lines: a mix can be expected.
The Commission itself first mooted the idea of an EPP
in 2000, stating that some harmonisation of criminal law
would be necessary, although the proposal was not taken
up in the Treaty of Nice. In 2001 a Commission Green
Paper on the criminal law protection of the financial
interests of the Community and the establishment of a
European Prosecutor was published (Commission of the
European Communities, (2001), Green Paper on criminal
protection of the financial interests of the Community and the
establishment of a European Prosecutor, 11 December, COM
(2001) 715). The EPP proposal was controversial from the
beginning because several Member States felt that such a
post would undermine national sovereignty in justice
matters. Some also felt that there were problems of
accountability and of ensuring a fair trial for the accused
and doubted the utility of the post.
In 2003 a follow-up report summarised responses from
the EU Member States to the Green Paper (Commission
of the European Communities, (2003) , Follow-up report on
the Green Paper on criminal protection of the financial interests of
the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor,
19 March, COM(2003)128). At that time, Belgium,
Greece, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain were in
favour of a European Public Prosecutor, whilst Austria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland and the United
Kingdom were opposed. The remaining Member States
including Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden had
their doubts.
In 2005 the proposed Constitutional Treaty contained a
provision enabling the Council to set up a European Public
Prosecutor by means of a unanimous decision. The remit
of the EPP would initially be limited to “combating crimes
affecting the financial interests of the Union”
(http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/constitutional-
treaty-key-elements-archived/article-128513) However,
the proposed Constitutional Treaty never came into force
and the wording was amended in the Lisbon Treaty.
The Stockholm Programme mentions the EPPO in its
part on criminal law:
In the field of judicial cooperation, the European Council
emphasises the need for Member States and Eurojust to
implement thoroughly Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of
16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust, which,
together with the Lisbon Treaty, offers an opportunity for the
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further development of Eurojust in the coming years, including
in relation to initiation of investigations and resolving
conflicts of competence. On the basis of an assessment of the
implementation of this instrument, new possibilities could be
considered in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Treaty, including giving further powers to the Eurojust
national members, reinforcement of the powers of the College
of Eurojust or the setting-up of a European Public Prosecutor
(The Stockholm Programme — An open and secure Europe
serving and protecting citizens, OJ C (2010) 115, point
3.1.1, p 13)
Its action plan foresees a legislative proposal for a
regulation providing Eurojust with powers to initiate
investigations, making Eurojust’s internal structure more
efficient and involving the European Parliament and
national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust’s
activities by 2012, to be followed by a Communication on
the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office
from Eurojust by 2013.
The House of Lords perceived a disparity between the
Stockholm Programme and its action plan. The following is
taken from House of Lords, (2011), The Select Committee
on the European Union, Sub-Committee F (Home
Affairs), “Implementation of the Stockholm Programme,
Transcript of Evidence session no 1”, Wednesday 13
October 2010. The evidence was given by James
Brokenshire, MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
and Minister for Crime Prevention, Home Office:
The Stockholm Programme was agreed by the European
Council in 2009 and the Commission was invited to present
an action plan in order to translate the aims and priorities of
the programme into concrete points. As is made clear in the
Government’s explanatory memorandum on the action plan,
we believe that there are a number of aspects in which the
action plan differs markedly form the agreed Stockholm
Programme. It was because of this disparity that the
Government signed up to the Council conclusions on the
Stockholm Action Plan in June. These conclusions, as you will
be aware, propose only those actions that fully conform to the
Stockholm Programme. The conclusions in many ways sent a
clear message to the Commission: that it should not underline
the role of national governments in setting the agenda for the
EU work on justice and home affairs by departing from the
decisions of heads of government.
In 2010 the European Parliament called on the
Commission to consult interested stakeholders, including
civil society, on all aspects related to the creation of an
EPPO for combating crimes affecting the financial interests
of the European Union and to step up the adoption of all
necessary measures for establishing this office (European
Parliament, (2010), Resolution of 6 May 2010 on the
protection of the Community’s financial interests and the
fight against fraud) The same year the European
Commission presented a reflection paper on the reform of
OLAF to the European Parliament’s budgetary control
committee, which mentioned that the EPPO and the
consolidation of the existing anti-fraud legislation needed a
thorough impact assessment.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
Since the original model for European Public
Prosecution was formulated in 1997, European criminal
law has progressed. The EU now has a European Arrest
Warrant and a European Evidence Warrant, even if the
latter is restricted in functionality. More convergence is
expected with a European Investigation Order (see for
example J Blackstock, (2010), The European Investigation
Order, New Journal of European Criminal Law, vol 1, 4, 481-98;
A Farries, (2010), “The European Investigation Order,
Stepping forward with care,”, New Journal of European
Criminal Law, vol 1, 4, 425-32) and a set of EU procedural
rights. For further information, see S White, (2010), “The
EU’s accession to the Convention on Human Rights: A
new era of closer cooperation between the Council of
Europe and the EU?”, NJECL, 04, pp 425-32; T. Lock,
(2011), “A critical account of the accession of the
European Union to the European Convention on Human
Rights, JUSTICE journal, vol 8, no 2, pp 11-30; S White,
(2011), “Accession of the European Union to the
European Convention on Human Rights”, JUSTICE
journal, vol 8, no 2, pp 58-70).1
The Charter of EU Fundamental Rights is now an integral
part of the EU Treaty and the EU is on the road to becoming
a party to the European Convention on Human Rights.
European criminal law has progressed through mutual
recognition, buttressed by harmonisation whenever
necessary. It has been argued that harmonisation was
necessary to create the conditions of mutual trust necessary
to the smooth functioning of mutual recognition.
It could therefore be argued that any proposal for the
creation of an EPPO should take into account the mutual
recognition acquis, which did not exist when the Corpus Juris
study was first conceived. A fresh perspective is needed,
which arguably obviates the need for the “two hats”
approach adopted in the original Corpus Juris study. Some
learned commentators have argued that the harmonisation
of criminal law is needed to go much further in the context
of Article 86 (see for example K Ligeti, (2011), “The
European Public Prosecutor’s Office: How should the
rules applicable to its procedure be determined?”, EuCLR
123-48). Article 86(3) states that regulations will
determine the general rules applicable to the European
Public Prosecutor’s Office, the conditions governing the
performance of its functions, the rules of procedure
applicable to its activities, as well as those governing the
admissibility of evidence and the rules applicable to the
judicial review of procedural measures taken by it in the
performance of its functions. A revised proposal for a
Directive on the criminal law protection of the EU
financial interests under Article 325(4) TFEU may help to
make progress on this count. With a decentralised EPPO,6
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the rules applicable concerning the admissibility of
evidence and the procedural review of procedural measures
could continue to be the rules adopted under mutual
recognition. In that model, the adoption of measures such
as the European Investigation Order would play an
important role. But would this be enough to make enough
of a difference to the practical functioning of anti-fraud
investigations and prosecution?
A DECENTRALISED EUROPEAN PUBLIC
PROSECUTORS’ (PLURAL) OFFICE?
A European Parliament study has suggested that the
EPPO would act as a complementary judicial body when
the Member States authorities fail to carry out their role
(European Parliament Study, Directorate-General for
Internal Policies Policy Department Budgetary Affairs,
(2011), Improving coordination between the EU bodies competent
in the area of police and judicial cooperation: moving towards a
European Prosecutor, p 38). However, complementarity
might well turn out to be as slippery a concept as
subsidiarity, at least in this context. Furthermore it can
only be applied in terms of a purely vertical model (as set
out in the Corpus Juris). This assumes that instances of
neglect of duty by national authorities would be reported
to a central EPPO, who would then instruct decentralised
delegated prosecutors to take action, on the basis of an
agreed definition of complementarity.
There is the stumbling block: instruct. It is difficult to see
how this would be conducive to good relations in (what
Zwiers has rightly called) a multilevel criminal justice
system.
Perhaps a flatter structure – more cooperative and (in
operational terms) more integrated – could do more to
encourage the protection of the financial interests of the
EU (model 2 in Table 1). Heads of (relevant) prosecution
services in the Member States could be designated as the
national member of the EPPO (henceforth NEPPs). They
would be given a specific responsibility for the protection
of the EU financial interests by their governments
according to a definition of “protection of the financial
interests of the EU” (as agreed in the Council of the
European Union under Art 325 TFEU).
Such an arrangement would overcome the potential
weakness of designating national staff who do not have
effective command over all the resources that might be
needed. The important thing is not to detach the European
and national levels and resources.
Each head of national prosecution services/national EPP
(NEPP) would no doubt wish to designate a Deputy and a
staff to hold responsibilities on a day-to-day basis. The
latter would maintain face to face relations with top-level
prosecutors/managers, who have to implement decisions to
prosecute. The legal obligation would remain with the
NEPPs for investigation and prosecution, which would
mean that all national resources would fall to the task. This
would be in keeping with Article 85, which requires that
prosecutions be carried out by national prosecution
authorities.
There is no reason why the heads, deputies and staff
should not have a desk in a central office (the EPPO in a
physical sense), however at other times they could
communicate with their peers in other Member States by
secure telephone, messaging systems and – when needed
for clarification of issues – by video conferencing. A central
office could of course exist. It might share a secretariat
with Eurojust and the European Judicial Network, at least
initially, and could be chaired in the administrative sense by
the EU Member States on a rotating basis.
This could be seen more as an adaptation to the progress
of mutual recognition, an application of subsidiarity and an
accommodation to the present times of austerity: a
proposal for setting up a new, fully-fledged European
institution setting up a new, vertical cooperation is likely to
be met (at best) with gritted teeth at the political level.
Progression to a “vertical” EPPO (model 3 in Table 1)
could be considered in time, based on the progress of a
NEPP. If so, the EPPO could build upon the NEPPs’
experience of investigations and prosecutions using the
resources of the Member States.
It might be objected that an arrangement would have
consequences differing little from the present situation, in
which – some of those active in the institutions – EU
frauds are not taken as seriously as national frauds. That
however is to misunderstand the situation on two levels.
First, as practitioners know, it is frauds in general (ie,
including frauds at national level) that are not always taken
as seriously as other issues. This needs to be addressed and
can be, through the present proposal. By conjoining the
prosecution resources applied to national and to EU
frauds, and by signally the political importance of both,
more vigorous action would be encouraged on both fronts.
The path signalled here could have the advantage of
highlighting and energising anti-fraud work in general.
That could only be for the good, both in operational terms
and as a step towards steps, as outlined above.
Second, any division of operational work into separate
agencies, arranged at different “levels”, is simply asking for
inefficiency, misunderstandings and delay. Better to
contract the levels into just one; and that is most simply
done by building on what is already there.
CONCLUSION: PROGRESSIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLES 85 AND 86
TFEU
After Lisbon, the debate remains fluid. Suggestions for
models include:
(i) a progressive transformation of Eurojust, given the
existing college and its national members more
powers; 7
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(ii) the creation of an EPPO distinct from Eurojust but
using Eurojust expertise;
(iii) the creation of an EPPO as a specialised unit within
Eurojust and
(iv) a merger of Eurojust and the EPPO, with their
respective decision-making mechanisms.
The Bruges Seminar – a strategic seminar called
“Eurojust and the Lisbon Treaty: towards more effective
action’ – was organised by Eurojust in cooperation with
the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European
Union. It was held in Bruges, Belgium from 20-22
September 20-22, 2010 and possible scenarios for the
organisation of the EPPO and its relationship with Euro
just were discussed in workshop 6. Some possible
combinations were suggested: the EPPO could sit in the
Eurojust College whenever matters related to the
protection of the financial interests of the Union are
discussed or nine national members from the participating
states could become deputy European Public Prosecutors.
The EPPO could also work as a “mini college.” The
suggestions are legion.
This paper has suggested that, in order to make practical
progress, two questions need to be untangled: a legal and
political question about the relations between Articles 85
and 86; and a question that is also of course legal and
political, but also is more practically focussed, on effective
use by the EEPO of national investigative and prosecution
resources.
This paper has argued that Articles 85 and 86 TFEU
allow for the possibility for a staged development of the
investigation and prosecution of crimes to the detriment of
the financial interests of the EU. Thus, it may be possible
to start off by a reinforcement of Eurojust, whilst the legal
instruments deemed to be necessary are being adopted.
Further progress and the adoption of the European
Investigation Order, in particular, may then make it
possible to extend an Article 85-based EPPO to an Article
86 based EPPO with a wider competence. Article 86(4)
TFEU states that the European Council may adopt a
decision amending in order to extend the powers of the
European Public Prosecutor’s Office to include serious
crime having a cross-border dimension. The European
Council would act unanimously after obtaining the consent
of the European Parliament and after consulting the
Commission.
Alternatively, action under Article 85 could drive in the
direction of a decentralised EPP, constituted by heads of
national prosecution services. Designating them as national
EPPs (NEPPs) would most directly lend all the resources
they command to the protection of the financial interests of
the EU. Implementing such a strategy would require some
thought, especially considering the variations in structure,
governance, accountability and occupational culture of the
prosecution services with Member States. However it might
turn out to be a quite direct route to applying national
prosecution (and by implication investigation) resources to
the protection of EU financial interests. Decentralisation is
discussed and indeed implemented in some other areas of
EU policy (think for example of competition) and there
seems no reason not to consider it here, alongside
proposals for a centralised EPPO and the ‘half-way house’
that could be offered by Eurojust.
• This article reflects on and extends some of the issues
raised at an IALS seminar held on December 12,
2011. Speakers included Aled Williams, Chairman of
Eurojust; Peter Csonka, DG JUST European
Commission; Professor John Spencer, Selwyn College
Cambridge and Chair of the UK European Criminal
Law Association; Professor Katalina Ligeti and
Valentina Covolo, Department of Law at the
University of Luxembourg; and Dr Simone White.
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